Yield Book Mortgage Research

The impact of ESG on MBS performance and prepayment



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The incorporation of sustainability and social responsibility measures into investment practices has often been handled separately from traditional financial assessment; however, in this publication we demonstrate that ESG considerations can provide significant value when integrated into workflows.

Last year, Yield Book introduced a quantitative-based methodology for agency residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) assets, producing ESG-focused metrics that analyzed and measured entities' Responsible Lending and Responsible Servicing behaviors and applying this at a security level. Market participants can use this information to identify mortgage pools that meet certain criteria. In this paper we show that the same information correlates to investment performance.

This publication focuses on prepayment behavior across the dimension of these socially oriented lending and servicing traits. We present the results through several common visualizations, including a correlation study, Scurves, weighted average loan age (WALA) ramps and a total return analysis. Our goal is to assist investors in identifying mortgage-backed security (MBS) pools that contain loans originated or serviced along commonly accepted social criteria and to support investment decisions with the benefit of observing prior results.

The study includes performance and prepayment information for each individual ESG metric, as well as aggregated loan attributes outside of ESG.

Our research highlights significant dispersion in the prepayment behavior of ESG cohorts and cannot be attributed to other collateral characteristics typically used in prepayment models. We find that investing based on Yield Book's ESG metrics generally leads to better financial performance and, in most cases, ESG MBS cohorts are observed to prepay more slowly.

AUTHORS

Marina Manoim

Quantitative MBS Modeling Data Lead marina.manoim@lseg.com

Irene Shi

Quant Data Analyst Manager Irene.shi@lseg.com

CONTRIBUTORS

Octavian Ceban

Senior Analyst, Research

Joseph Corrado

RMBS Data Scientist

Hui Ding

Head of Agency RMBS Research

Vlad-lonut Ene

Senior Analyst, Product

Jake Katz

Head of Non-Agency RMBS Research and Data Science

Katie Prideaux

Head of Sustainable Investment Analytics Product

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Yield Book's ESG Metric Methodology overview

Last year, Yield Book launched a set of ESG metrics intended to facilitate detection of negative and positive behaviors in a servicing and lending context based on loan-level data; a summary of each metric is given below. We then investigate these metrics' connection to financial performance.

For additional information on our Sustainable Investment Analytics solutions, please visit <u>Sustainable Investment Analytics | Yield Book</u>

Responsible servicing

Responsible behavior in a servicing context is the practice of extending fair and reasonable terms to borrowers during the servicing process. To facilitate the measurement of – and to highlight the extent of – potentially predatory practices within a deal or market segment, we have developed quantitative-based metrics.

Responsible delinquency policy

Positive behaviors can be observed when the servicer actively attempts to seek modification with the borrower to prevent foreclosure and other routes such as default and buyout, particularly prior to legally enforced deadlines. This measure shows servicers' willingness to provide positive outcomes for the borrower by helping them avoid incurring further debt or losing their home.

Relative default rate

Foreclosure is the ultimate worst outcome for both the borrower and the servicer. It is a costly legal process usually avoided by the servicer and becomes a major credit issue for the borrower; however, a relatively high value in combination with other characteristics could also indicate an unwillingness to engage in alternative options for the borrower.

Loan churn

Loan churn is understood to be the process of encouraging borrowers to refinance repeatedly in a short timeframe following the origination of their loan with little benefit to the borrower, with the servicer benefiting from these administrative fees at each refinance.

Responsible Lending

Responsible behavior in a lending context is the practice of extending fair and reasonable terms to borrowers during the loan origination process. To facilitate the measurement of – and to highlight the extent of – potentially predatory practices within a deal or market segment, we have developed quantitative-based metrics.

Outsized rates

This metric provides a measure of a lender's overall deviation from the population for the interest rates extended to borrowers. We developed a benchmark for prediction of spread at origination (SATO) given input characteristics at each point in time, based on a linear regression model to obtain coefficients of the various inputs across loan-level data from 2010-2021. Each lender's distribution is then compared to the population through a density comparison.

Early pay default risk

A mortgage loan is considered to have substantial early payment default risk (EPDR) if it displays delinquency above a threshold period within a relatively short timeframe following loan origination. While this can occur even with the involved parties acting responsibly during loan origination, prevalence of early delinquency situations in recently originated loans for a specific lender's production highlights a potential inclination towards predatory behavior.

Irresponsible lending

Irresponsible lending, a predatory behavior on the part of the lender, is defined by the consistent offering of loans to borrowers with high-risk credentials. This can result in the borrower facing default risks, falling behind on existing commitments and experiencing financial hardship. This behavior expressed in regard to loans with poor credit is identified by looking at the consistent extension of credit to high-risk borrowers relative to other lenders within either a deal or

market segment, in combination with default rates. We note that lending to risky borrowers is not predatory – this is of course required for healthily functioning markets – but is an issue to be highlighted if it occurs consistently and over a long period.


We focus on the 12 months averaged pool-level versions of the metrics for this analysis.


ESG metric distributions


Figures 1 and 2 below show the distribution of pool-level metrics across all three agencies: GNMA, FNMA and FHLMC. Distributions are shown via violin plots demonstrating both summary statistics (first quartile, median, third quartile) and the kernel density of the values for each of the metrics.

Figure 1. Distributions of responsible lending scores

Figure 1a. Outsized rates (OR)









The distributions of early pay default risk seen below clearly visualize the different collateral credit quality and lending practices for FNMA and FHLMC vs GNMA.

Figure 1b. Early pay default risk (EPDR)











Figure 1c. Risky lending (RL)









Source: Yield Book

Figure 2. Distributions of responsible servicing scores

Figure 2a. Loan churn (LC)











Figure 2b. Relative default rate (RDR)




On the delinquency policy charts below, we see again the different servicing practices of government-sponsored enterprises vs GNMA. For this metric, higher values indicate more responsible practices.

Figure 2c. Delinquency policy (DP)







Source: Yield Book

Total return analysis

The charts in Figures 3 and 4 show the moving time window of two months' total returns on the investment for the universe of FNMA mortgage pools.

The results in Tables 1 and 2 show total return for two-month periods assuming various risk-free rates. The investment universe is segmented into two sub-cohorts (low and high) for each ESG metric. The sub-cohorts are split at the weighted average value of the pool-level metrics (weighted by the current balance of the pool).

On the responsible lending side, the charts and more detailed data in Table 1 show that investing in cohorts with lower EDPR scores or lower risky lending scores on average produce higher total returns. Since the higher outsized rate score is indicative of higher loan rates, investing in those cohorts predicably produces higher returns.

Figure 3: Total return graphs by ESG RL cohorts (with 0.1 risk-free rate)

Figure 3a: Total return graph outsized rates (OR)




Figure 3b: Total return graph early pay default risk (EPDR)




Figure 3c: Total return graph risky lending (RL)




Table 1: Total return by ESG RL cohorts

		Total return for the two months period												
Risk free	Cohort													
rate (%)	type	Jan-21	Feb-21	Mar-21	Apr-21	May-21	Jun-21	Jul-21	Aug-21	Sep-21	Oct-21	Nov-21	De c-21	Avg
0.1	ALL	-0.73%	-1.40%	0.02%	0.65%	-0.11%	0.64%	0.48%	-0.59%	-0.64%	-0.01%	-0.15%	-2.06%	-0.33%
0.1	EPDR HIGH	-2.17%	-2.80%	0.34%	1.47%	0.36%	1.03%	0.64%	-1.02%	-0.99%	0.03%	0.04%	-2.22%	-0.44%
0.1	EPDR LOW	-0.58%	-1.15%	-0.06%	0.41%	-0.29%	0.47%	0.39%	-0.34%	-0.42%	-0.04%	-0.30%	-1.92%	-0.32%
0.1	RL HIGH	-0.98%	-1.62%	0.09%	0.82%	-0.02%	0.70%	0.50%	-0.69%	-0.75%	-0.01%	-0.12%	-2.09%	-0.35%
0.1	RL LOW	-0.03%	-0.76%	-0.20%	0.19%	-0.37%	0.49%	0.40%	-0.27%	-0.34%	-0.01%	-0.25%	-1.98%	-0.26%
0.1	OR HIGH	0.13%	-0.31%	-0.23%	-0.22%	-0.69%	0.09%	0.26%	0.01%	-0.16%	0.01%	-0.34%	-1.90%	-0.28%
	OR LOW	-1.02%	-1.74%	0.09%	0.89%	0.03%	0.77%	0.53%	-0.71%	-0.75%	-0.02%	-0.10%	-2.11%	-0.34%
1.0	ALL	-0.72%	-1.39%	0.02%	0.66%	-0.11%	0.65%	0.49%	-0.58%	-0.64%	-0.01%	-0.15%	-2.06%	-0.32%
1.0	EPDR HIGH	-2.17%	-2.80%	0.34%	1.48%	0.36%	1.03%	0.65%	-1.01%	-0.99%	0.03%	0.04%	-2.21%	-0.44%
1.0	EPDR LOW	-0.57%	-1.15%	-0.05%	0.42%	-0.28%	0.48%	0.40%	-0.33%	-0.41%	-0.03%	-0.30%	-1.92%	-0.31%
1.0	RL HIGH	-0.97%	-1.61%	0.10%	0.82%	-0.02%	0.70%	0.51%	-0.69%	-0.74%	-0.01%	-0.12%	-2.08%	-0.34%
1.0	RL LOW	-0.02%	-0.76%	-0.19%	0.20%	-0.36%	0.50%	0.41%	-0.27%	-0.33%	0.00%	-0.24%	-1.97%	-0.25%
1.0	OR HIGH	0.14%	-0.30%	-0.22%	-0.21%	-0.68%	0.10%	0.27%	0.02%	-0.15%	0.01%	-0.34%	-1.90%	-0.27%
1.0	OR LOW	-1.01%	-1.73%	0.10%	0.89%	0.04%	0.78%	0.53%	-0.71%	-0.74%	-0.01%	-0.10%	-2.10%	-0.34%
2.0	ALL	-0.71%	-1.39%	0.03%	0.67%	-0.10%	0.66%	0.49%	-0.58%	-0.63%	0.00%	-0.14%	-2.05%	-0.31%
2.0	EPDR HIGH	-2.17%	-2.80%	0.34%	1.48%	0.36%	1.03%	0.65%	-1.01%	-0.98%	0.04%	0.04%	-2.21%	-0.44%
2.0	EPDR LOW	-0.56%	-1.15%	-0.04%	0.43%	-0.27%	0.49%	0.41%	-0.33%	-0.40%	-0.03%	-0.29%	-1.91%	-0.30%
2.0	RL HIGH	-0.96%	-1.61%	0.11%	0.83%	-0.01%	0.71%	0.52%	-0.68%	-0.73%	0.00%	-0.11%	-2.08%	-0.34%
2.0	RL LOW	-0.01%	-0.75%	-0.18%	0.21%	-0.35%	0.50%	0.42%	-0.26%	-0.33%	0.00%	-0.24%	-1.97%	-0.25%
2.0	OR HIGH	0.15%	-0.30%	-0.21%	-0.19%	-0.67%	0.11%	0.28%	0.03%	-0.14%	0.02%	-0.33%	-1.89%	-0.26%
2.0	OR LOW	-1.00%	-1.73%	0.10%	0.90%	0.04%	0.78%	0.54%	-0.70%	-0.74%	-0.01%	-0.09%	-2.10%	-0.33%
	ALL	-0.70%	-1.38%	0.04%	0.67%	-0.09%	0.66%	0.50%	-0.57%	-0.62%	0.01%	-0.14%	-2.05%	-0.31%
3.0	EPDR HIGH	-2.17%	-2.80%	0.35%	1.48%	0.37%	1.04%	0.65%	-1.01%	-0.98%	0.04%	0.05%	-2.21%	-0.43%
3.0	EPDR LOW	-0.55%	-1.14%	-0.02%	0.44%	-0.27%	0.49%	0.42%	-0.32%	-0.39%	-0.02%	-0.28%	-1.91%	-0.30%
3.0	RL HIGH	-0.95%	-1.61%	0.12%	0.83%	-0.01%	0.71%	0.52%	-0.68%	-0.73%	0.00%	-0.11%	-2.07%	-0.33%
3.0	RL LOW	0.01%	-0.75%	-0.17%	0.21%	-0.35%	0.51%	0.42%	-0.25%	-0.32%	0.01%	-0.23%	-1.96%	-0.24%
3.0	OR HIGH	0.17%	-0.29%	-0.20%	-0.18%	-0.66%	0.12%	0.29%	0.04%	-0.13%	0.03%	-0.32%	-1.89%	-0.25%
3.0	OR LOW	-0.99%	-1.73%	0.11%	0.91%	0.05%	0.79%	0.54%	-0.70%	-0.73%	0.00%	-0.09%	-2.09%	-0.33%
	ALL	-0.68%	-1.38%	0.05%	0.68%	-0.09%	0.67%	0.50%	-0.56%	-0.62%	0.01%	-0.13%	-2.04%	-0.30%
4.0	EPDR HIGH	-2.17%	-2.80%	0.35%	1.48%	0.37%	1.04%	0.65%	-1.00%	-0.98%	0.04%	0.05%	-2.20%	-0.43%
	EPDR LOW	-0.54%	-1.14%	-0.01%	0.45%	-0.26%	0.50%	0.43%	-0.31%	-0.38%	-0.01%	-0.28%	-1.90%	-0.29%
4.0	RL HIGH	-0.94%	-1.60%	0.13%	0.84%	0.00%	0.72%	0.53%	-0.67%	-0.72%	0.01%	-0.10%	-2.07%	-0.32%
4.0	RL LOW	0.02%	-0.75%	-0.16%	0.22%	-0.34%	0.52%	0.43%	-0.25%	-0.31%	0.01%	-0.23%	-1.96%	-0.23%
4.0	OR HIGH	0.18%	-0.29%	-0.18%	-0.17%	-0.65%	0.13%	0.30%	0.05%	-0.12%	0.04%	-0.32%	-1.88%	-0.24%
4.0	OR LOW	-0.98%	-1.72%	0.12%	0.91%	0.05%	0.79%	0.55%	-0.69%	-0.72%	0.01%	-0.08%	-2.09%	-0.32%
5.0	ALL	-0.67%	-1.38%	0.06%	0.69%	-0.08%	0.67%	0.51%	-0.56%	-0.61%	0.02%	-0.13%	-2.04%	-0.29%
5.0	EPDR HIGH	-2.16%	-2.80%	0.35%	1.48%	0.37%	1.04%	0.66%	-1.00%	-0.97%	0.04%	0.05%	-2.20%	-0.43%
5.0	EPDR LOW	-0.52%	-1.13%	0.00%	0.45%	-0.25%	0.51%	0.43%	-0.30%	-0.38%	0.00%	-0.27%	-1.89%	-0.28%
5.0	RL HIGH	-0.93%	-1.60%	0.14%	0.85%	0.01%	0.73%	0.53%	-0.66%	-0.71%	0.02%	-0.09%	-2.06%	-0.32%
5.0	RL LOW	0.03%	-0.74%	-0.15%	0.23%	-0.33%	0.52%	0.44%	-0.24%	-0.31%	0.02%	-0.22%	-1.95%	-0.22%
5.0	OR HIGH	0.19%	-0.28%	-0.17%	-0.16%	-0.64%	0.14%	0.31%	0.06%	-0.12%	0.04%	-0.31%	-1.87%	-0.23%
5.0	OR LOW	-0.97%	-1.72%	0.13%	0.92%	0.06%	0.80%	0.55%	-0.68%	-0.72%	0.01%	-0.08%	-2.08%	-0.32%

On the responsible servicing side, the charts and more detailed data in Table 2 show that investing in cohorts with lower loan churn scores also, on average, produce higher total returns.

Due to the agencies' disclosure content, there is no sufficient data available to complete a similar analysis for relative default rate scores and delinquency policy scores.

Figure 4: Total return graph by ESG RS cohorts loan churn (LC) (with 0.1 risk-free rate)




Table 2: Total return by RS ESG cohorts

		Total return for the two months period												
Rist free rate (%)	Cohort type	Jan-21	Feb-21	Mar-21	Apr-21	May-21	Jun-21	Jul-21	Aug-21	Sep-21	Oct-21	Nov-21	De c-21	Avg
0.1	ALL	-0.73%	-1.40%	0.02%	0.65%	-0.11%	0.64%	0.48%	-0.59%	-0.64%	-0.01%	-0.15%	-2.06%	-0.33%
0.1	LC HIGH	-0.73%	-1.40%	0.02%	0.65%	-0.12%	0.63%	0.45%	-0.60%	-0.56%	-0.01%	-0.09%	-2.02%	-0.32%
0.1	LCLOW	-0.58%	-1.34%	0.04%	0.68%	-0.02%	0.81%	0.63%	-0.53%	-0.68%	-0.01%	-0.16%	-2.06%	-0.27%
1.0	ALL	-0.72%	-1.39%	0.02%	0.66%	-0.11%	0.65%	0.49%	-0.58%	-0.64%	-0.01%	-0.15%	-2.06%	-0.32%
1.0	LC HIGH	-0.72%	-1.39%	0.02%	0.66%	-0.11%	0.64%	0.46%	-0.60%	-0.55%	-0.01%	-0.08%	-2.02%	-0.31%
1.0	LCLOW	-0.57%	-1.34%	0.04%	0.69%	-0.01%	0.81%	0.63%	-0.53%	-0.68%	-0.01%	-0.16%	-2.06%	-0.26%
2.0	ALL	-0.71%	-1.39%	0.03%	0.67%	-0.10%	0.66%	0.49%	-0.58%	-0.63%	0.00%	-0.14%	-2.05%	-0.31%
2.0	LC HIGH	-0.71%	-1.39%	0.03%	0.66%	-0.11%	0.64%	0.46%	-0.59%	-0.55%	0.00%	-0.08%	-2.01%	-0.30%
2.0	LCLOW	-0.56%	-1.34%	0.05%	0.69%	-0.01%	0.82%	0.63%	-0.52%	-0.67%	0.00%	-0.15%	-2.05%	-0.26%
3.0	ALL	-0.70%	-1.38%	0.04%	0.67%	-0.09%	0.66%	0.50%	-0.57%	-0.62%	0.01%	-0.14%	-2.05%	-0.31%
3.0	LC HIGH	-0.70%	-1.39%	0.04%	0.67%	-0.10%	0.65%	0.47%	-0.58%	-0.54%	0.01%	-0.07%	-2.01%	-0.30%
3.0	LCLOW	-0.55%	-1.34%	0.06%	0.70%	-0.01%	0.82%	0.64%	-0.52%	-0.67%	0.01%	-0.14%	-2.05%	-0.25%
4.0	ALL	-0.68%	-1.38%	0.05%	0.68%	-0.09%	0.67%	0.50%	-0.56%	-0.62%	0.01%	-0.13%	-2.04%	-0.30%
4.0	LC HIGH	-0.69%	-1.38%	0.05%	0.68%	-0.09%	0.66%	0.48%	-0.58%	-0.53%	0.01%	-0.07%	-2.00%	-0.29%
4.0	LCLOW	-0.55%	-1.33%	0.06%	0.70%	0.00%	0.83%	0.64%	-0.51%	-0.66%	0.01%	-0.14%	-2.04%	-0.25%
5.0	ALL	-0.67%	-1.38%	0.06%	0.69%	-0.08%	0.67%	0.51%	-0.56%	-0.61%	0.02%	-0.13%	-2.04%	-0.29%
5.0	LC HIGH	-0.68%	-1.38%	0.06%	0.69%	-0.09%	0.66%	0.48%	-0.57%	-0.52%	0.02%	-0.06%	-1.99%	-0.28%
5.0	LC LOW	-0.54%	-1.33%	0.07%	0.71%	0.00%	0.83%	0.65%	-0.51%	-0.66%	0.02%	-0.13%	-2.04%	-0.24%

S-curves and WALA ramps

In the charts that follow, we present side-by-side graphs for various combinations of agency and RL/RS metrics. Each row of graphs has an S-curve on the left and a WALA ramp on the right.

The **S-curves** graph prepayment rates based on interest rate incentive experienced for 30-year FRM MBS cohorts for 2021-2022 factor dates.

The WALA ramps plot prepayment seasoning for 30-year FRM MBS cohorts for 2021-2022 factor dates.

For each ESG metric, we have created two loan-level cohorts: high and low. The high cohort contains all loans with ESG scores above the balance weighted average of the ESG score. The low cohort is the complementary set. We could not produce graphs for all metrics because certain metrics highlight rare events and lack sufficient differentiation to create cohorts of adequate size – for example, EPDR events for FNMA loans.

Figure 5: Responsible lending metrics

For outsized rates, higher score cohorts (the part of the loan universe with the higher rates) predictably prepay faster, especially in GNMA space.

Figure 5a: Outsized rates (OR) FNMA




Figure 5b: Outsized rates (OR) GNMA FHA





Figure 5c: Outsized rates (OR) GNMA VA



The risky lending charts below show faster prepayment for GNMA high score cohorts. This effect is less pronounced for FNMA cohorts, which reflects known, inherent different characteristics of FNMA and GNMA collateral.

Figure 5d: Risky lending (RL) FNMA




Figure 5e: Risky lending (RL) GNMA FHA




Figure 5f: Risky lending (RL) GNMA VA




Figure 6: Responsible servicing metrics

In line with our expectations, the charts show that cohorts with higher loan churn and relative default rate scores prepay faster than the corresponding lower score cohorts.

Figure 6a: Loan churn (LC) FNMA




Figure 6b: Loan churn (LC) GNMA FHA




Figure 6b: Loan churn (LC) GNMA VA




Figure 6c: Relative default rate (RDR) GNMA FHA




Figure 6c: Relative default rate (RDR) GNMA VA




Figure 6c: Delinquency policy (DP) FNMA




Figure 6c: Delinquency policy (DP) GNMA FHA





Figure 6c: Delinquency policy (DP) GNMA VA




For the delinquency policy metric, a higher score means that servicers do a better job of mitigating borrower delinquency and avoiding foreclosures. Consequently, the seasoning charts show that high-score cohorts prepay more slowly than lower-score cohorts for both GNMA and FNMA, with the effect being more pronounced for FNMA.

Metric distribution and CPR regression by entity

Responsible lending metrics


We present individual 12-month weighted average metric scores from the selected top lenders as of December 2020 below. Due to broader underwriting guidelines, the distribution for GNMA lenders is more right-skewed than the corresponding distributions for FMNA and FHLMC.

Figure 7: Histogram of RL ESG scores by lender



We plot three-month prepayment speeds (3m CPR) against each ESG metric by lender. In the analysis, we include loans originated in 2020 by the selected top sellers. Three-month CPR is calculated as of December 2021. The size of each circle represents the outstanding balance of the lender.

Figure 8: Correlation of CPR to RL ESG metrics FNMA and GNMA




For outsized rates, a high score indicates the loan was made by a lender who systematically originates loans with rates higher than can be explained by the loan's characteristics and the prevailing market rate. The results above align with our hypothesis that loans with high outsized rates should prepay faster.

In the coming months, we want to extend this analysis to include a study of the involuntary vs. voluntary prepayment speeds for ESG cohorts for all agencies.

Responsible lending metrics


We show individual 12-month weighted average metric scores from the selected top servicers as of December 2021 below.

Figure 9: Histogram of RS ESG scores by lender



We plot three-month prepayment speeds (3m CPR) against each ESG metric by servicer. In the analysis, we include loans originated in 2021 by the selected top servicers. 3m CPR is calculated as of December 2021. The size of each circle represents the outstanding balance of the servicer.

Figure 10: Correlation of CPR to RS ESG metrics FNMA and GNMA



For loan churn, a higher score means the servicers are actively encouraging borrowers to refinance repeatedly. This will naturally drive up the prepayment speed.

Conclusion

In summary, our findings indicate three critical outcomes:

- Four out of the five ESG metrics used in the prepayment study demonstrated consistent behavior in terms of
 relative prepayment speeds for high and low ESG cohorts. The fifth metric, delinquency policy, followed our
 expectations for the seasoning curve and only slightly deviated from the other ESG cohorts at the higher incentive
 rates end of the S-curve.
- In the total return study, three out of the four ESG metrics showed higher average returns during the period under consideration. The only easily explainable exception was the outsized rates metric.
- The correlation of speeds vs ESG metrics study also demonstrated stable and consistent non-negative correlations.

These results suggest that the use of Yield Book-developed ESG scoring metrics would not only enable responsible investing but could also enhance the performance of MBS portfolio.

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